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Since	  the	  invasion	  of	  2003,	  a	  complex	  array	  of	  political,	  religious	  and	  ethno-­‐sectarian	  
factions	  have	  formed	  civil	  society	  movements;	  uncensored	  news	  has	  been	  consumed	  across	  
the	  nation;	  ordinary	  citizens	  have	  taken	  to	  the	  streets	  to	  protest	  key	  government	  decisions;	  
and	  various	  local	  councils	  have	  been	  formed,	  deliberating	  on	  key	  decisions	  facing	  their	  
immediate	  communities.	  Given	  this	  context,	  this	  paper	  focuses	  on	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  the	  
Iraqi	  Federation	  of	  Oil	  Unions	  (IFOU),	  Iraq’s	  largest	  and	  most	  powerful	  independent	  workers	  
union.	  The	  IFOU	  has	  repeatedly	  taken	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  to	  task	  over	  their	  poor	  pay	  and	  
the	  dangerous	  nature	  of	  their	  work,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  government’s	  initial	  kowtowing	  to	  US	  
plans	  to	  privatise	  the	  entire	  Iraqi	  oil	  sector.	  To	  do	  this,	  the	  IFOU	  have	  utilised	  a	  variety	  of	  
democratic	  mechanisms	  including	  peaceful	  strikes	  and	  protests,	  media	  campaigns	  and	  
political	  lobbying.	  Such	  moves	  have	  met	  with	  mixed	  results	  in	  Baghdad	  –	  at	  times	  the	  central	  
government	  has	  pandered	  to	  the	  requests	  of	  IFOU,	  but	  it	  has	  also	  gone	  as	  far	  as	  issuing	  
arrest	  warrants	  for	  its	  senior	  members.	  The	  IFOU	  therefore	  serve	  as	  an	  interesting	  example	  







In	  March	  of	  2003	  the	  world’s	  last	  remaining	  superpower	  launched	  a	  pre-­‐emptive	  strike	  on	  a	  
sovereign	  nation	  without	  UN	  approval	  or	  popular	  domestic	  or	  global	  support.	  The	  
justification	  given	  to	  the	  world	  for	  such	  an	  attack	  was	  twofold:	  Iraq	  was	  accused	  of	  
harboring	  Weapons	  of	  Mass	  Destruction	  (WMD)	  and	  having	  links	  to	  Al-­‐Qaeda,	  both	  of	  which	  
could	  not	  be	  permitted	  in	  a	  post-­‐9/11	  world.	  However,	  when	  evidence	  for	  either	  Iraq’s	  
WMDs	  or	  links	  to	  terrorism	  failed	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  war	  and	  the	  nine	  subsequent	  
years	  of	  military	  occupation,	  the	  Bush	  administration	  was	  forced	  to	  re-­‐frame	  the	  war	  and	  
redefine	  the	  parameters	  of	  success.	  To	  do	  this,	  the	  US	  began	  speaking	  about	  bringing	  
democracy	  to	  Iraq	  as	  if	  it	  had	  always	  been	  one	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  war	  itself.	  The	  notion	  that	  
the	  US	  could	  use	  its	  superior	  military	  might	  to	  invade	  a	  sovereign	  state,	  topple	  an	  existing	  
regime	  and	  implant	  democracy	  set	  a	  new	  and	  unfortunate	  precedent	  which	  has	  come	  to	  be	  
termed	  the	  ‘Bush	  doctrine’	  (Jervis,	  2003).	  	  
	  
For	  the	  first	  few	  years	  the	  project	  to	  bring	  democracy	  to	  Iraq	  had	  its	  share	  of	  successes	  as	  
the	  Iraqi	  people	  proved	  themselves	  adept	  at	  understanding	  and	  utilizing	  democratic	  
mechanisms	  and	  institutions.	  Almost	  overnight	  a	  complex	  array	  of	  political,	  religious	  and	  
ethno-­‐sectarian	  based	  civil	  society	  movements	  and	  political	  parties	  (re)emerged	  forming	  
policy-­‐driven	  campaigns	  and	  complex	  alliances;	  uncensored	  news	  was	  enthusiastically	  
produced	  and	  consumed	  across	  the	  nation;	  protest	  movements	  agitated	  towards	  greater	  
inclusion,	  diversity	  and	  debate;	  local	  councils	  were	  formed,	  deliberating	  and	  deciding	  on	  key	  
decisions	  facing	  their	  immediate	  communities;	  and	  a	  series	  of	  nation-­‐wide	  elections	  brought	  
a	  democratically	  elected	  government	  to	  power	  in	  2006	  (Davis,	  2004,	  2007;	  Isakhan,	  2008,	  
2011,	  2012a).	  However,	  one	  of	  the	  unfortunate	  consequences	  of	  the	  US	  effort	  to	  bring	  
democracy	  to	  Iraq	  was	  that	  many	  key	  ethno-­‐religious	  political	  factions	  viewed	  it	  as	  an	  
opportunity	  to	  pedal	  their	  own	  relatively	  narrow	  and	  very	  divisive	  political	  rhetoric	  (Davis,	  
2007;	  Isakhan,	  2013).	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  was	  constituted	  not	  so	  much	  by	  
a	  body	  who	  wanted	  to	  draw	  Iraq	  together	  behind	  a	  common	  ideology	  and	  to	  work	  towards	  a	  
collective	  and	  egalitarian	  future,	  as	  it	  was	  by	  representatives	  who	  would	  fight	  on	  behalf	  of	  






Foremost	  among	  these,	  Prime	  Minister	  Nuri	  Al-­‐Maliki	  gradually	  exposed	  himself	  as	  
preferring	  the	  style	  of	  governance	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  other	  Arab	  states	  
alternatively	  as	  ‘liberalised	  autocracy’	  (Brumberg,	  2002),	  ‘semi-­‐authoritarianism’	  (Ottaway,	  
2003)	  or	  ‘pluralised	  authoritarianism’	  (Posusney	  &	  Angrist,	  2005).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  that	  the	  
Maliki	  government	  consolidated	  its	  incumbency	  while	  putting	  in	  place	  measures	  that	  can	  be	  
considered	  more	  or	  less	  liberal.	  To	  do	  this,	  the	  regime	  utilised	  (and	  controlled)	  nominally	  
democratic	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  elections,	  media	  freedoms,	  political	  opposition	  and	  civil	  
society	  as	  part	  of	  their	  strategy	  to	  retain	  power.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  Iraqi	  people	  have	  
become	  increasingly	  disillusioned	  with	  their	  political	  leaders	  and	  deeply	  critical	  of	  their	  
ability	  to	  provide	  a	  robust	  and	  genuine	  democracy	  –	  hence	  the	  mass	  protests	  that	  swept	  
across	  Iraq	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  popular	  Arab	  Revolutions	  of	  2010-­‐12.	  However,	  these	  latest	  
Iraqi	  protests	  –	  these	  mass	  displays	  of	  informal	  power	  -­‐	  are	  only	  the	  most	  recent	  and	  overt	  
sign	  of	  the	  hidden	  geographies	  that	  are	  agitating	  towards	  democracy	  in	  this	  deeply	  troubled	  
and	  increasingly	  authoritarian	  state.	  Given	  this	  context,	  this	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  specific	  
case	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  Federation	  of	  Oil	  Unions	  (IFOU),	  Iraq’s	  largest	  and	  most	  powerful	  
independent	  workers	  union	  and	  argues	  that	  they	  may	  well	  be	  counted	  among	  the	  nation’s	  
greatest	  bulwarks	  against	  both	  foreign	  occupation	  and	  rising	  authoritarianism.	  This	  chapter	  
concludes	  by	  arguing	  that	  Iraqi	  citizens	  who	  play	  an	  active	  role	  in	  their	  own	  governance	  and	  
participate	  in	  democratic	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  workers	  movements	  and	  trade	  unions	  are	  
helping	  to	  create	  a	  more	  robust	  democracy.	  
	  
Resisting	  Foreign	  Occupation	  and	  Rising	  Authoritarianism	  
With	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Baathist	  regime	  in	  April	  2003	  came	  a	  dramatic	  upsurge	  in	  trade	  
unions	  and	  workers	  movements	  across	  Iraq.	  These	  included	  those	  which	  represented	  the	  
interests	  of	  Iraqi	  doctors,	  nurses,	  taxi	  drivers,	  university	  staff,	  police,	  electricians,	  engineers,	  
journalists,	  teachers,	  carpenters,	  customs	  officers	  and	  emergency	  service	  personnel.	  They	  
have	  repeatedly	  used	  non-­‐violent	  protests,	  strikes,	  sit-­‐ins	  and	  walk-­‐outs	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  
attention	  to	  important	  issues	  such	  as	  their	  poor	  working	  conditions,	  the	  interference	  they	  





ineffectual	  government	  regulation	  and	  the	  dangerous	  nature	  of	  their	  jobs.	  On	  paper	  such	  
union	  movements	  are	  illegal	  because,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  US-­‐led	  coalition	  went	  to	  
great	  lengths	  to	  overturn	  many	  Saddam-­‐era	  laws,	  they	  did	  not	  tamper	  with	  the	  1987	  ‘Decree	  
150’	  that	  stripped	  workers	  of	  their	  basic	  rights:	  it	  abolished	  the	  minimum	  wage,	  and	  
quashed	  any	  effort	  to	  bargain	  collectively,	  to	  organise	  and	  to	  strike	  ("The	  Solidarity	  Centre,"	  
2007).	  Under	  the	  Baath,	  the	  only	  official	  union	  had	  been	  the	  state	  sanctioned	  General	  
Federation	  of	  Trade	  Unions	  (GFTU)	  which	  was	  little	  more	  than	  a	  rubber	  stamp	  for	  
government	  policy.	  	  
	  
Despite	  being	  officially	  illegal,	  the	  thousands	  of	  Iraqis	  who	  worked	  for	  the	  nation’s	  Southern	  
Oil	  Company	  (SOC)	  formed	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  and	  strongest	  union	  movements	  to	  emerge	  in	  
post-­‐Saddam	  Iraq.	  Under	  the	  leadership	  of	  President	  Hassan	  Jumaa	  Awwad	  Al-­‐Asady	  they	  
formed	  the	  Southern	  Oil	  Company	  Union	  (SOCU)	  immediately	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  Baghdad	  in	  
April	  2003	  ("Oil	  Workers’	  Union,"	  2005).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  two	  substantive	  facts	  about	  
the	  SOCU.	  Firstly,	  the	  SOCU	  (and	  its	  later	  iterations	  such	  as	  IFOU,	  see	  below)	  largely	  
represents	  the	  interests	  of	  Iraq’s	  Shia-­‐dominated	  southern	  regions	  which	  are	  also	  home	  to	  
the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Iraq’s	  oil	  reserves.	  As	  an	  example,	  the	  three	  provinces	  of	  Nasiriya,	  
Maysan	  and	  Basra	  alone	  hold	  around	  71	  percent	  of	  Iraq’s	  oil	  –	  literally	  billions	  worth	  of	  
natural	  resources	  (Munsoon,	  2009:	  185).	  Secondly,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  because	  of	  
SOCU’s	  sheer	  size	  it	  has	  managed	  to	  retain	  its	  political	  independence	  from	  the	  many	  major	  
political	  parties	  or	  movements	  that	  have	  jostled	  for	  power	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  former	  
regime.	  Beyond	  this,	  it	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  SOCU	  was	  very	  clear	  about	  its	  two	  central	  
platforms	  from	  its	  inception:	  it	  was	  adamantly	  opposed	  to	  the	  US	  occupation;	  and	  it	  sought	  
to	  protect	  Iraq’s	  oil	  sector	  from	  privatization	  and	  international	  plundering.	  On	  the	  former,	  
Al-­‐Asady	  has	  stated	  bluntly	  that	  “It	  is	  a	  deep	  and	  patriotic	  feeling	  of	  all	  the	  union’s	  members	  
that	  the	  occupation	  forces	  must	  leave	  the	  country	  immediately,	  whatever	  the	  
consequences”	  (Al-­‐Asady	  cited	  in	  "Oil	  Workers’	  Union,"	  2005).	  While	  on	  the	  latter,	  Al-­‐Asady	  
has	  commented	  that:	  
We	  will	  stand	  firm	  against	  this	  imperialist	  plan	  that	  would	  hand	  over	  Iraq’s	  wealth	  to	  





it...we	  are	  taking	  this	  path	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  Iraq’s	  glory	  even	  if	  it	  costs	  us	  our	  lives.	  
Iraqis	  are	  capable	  of	  managing	  their	  companies	  and	  their	  investments	  by	  themselves.	  
(Al-­‐Asady	  cited	  in	  "Oil	  Workers’	  Union,"	  2005)	  
	  
In	  May	  2003,	  SOCU	  faced	  its	  first	  challenge	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  private	  US	  construction	  and	  
military	  contracting	  company,	  Kellogg	  Brown	  and	  Root	  (KBR),	  then	  a	  subsidiary	  of	  
Halliburton.	  KBR	  were	  put	  in	  charge	  of	  organising	  and	  securing	  Iraq’s	  oil	  sector	  by	  the	  US	  
occupation	  and	  therefore	  attempted	  to	  take	  it	  over	  with	  military	  support	  from	  the	  US.	  The	  
SOCU	  immediately	  resisted	  and	  were	  highly	  suspicious	  of	  KBR,	  seeing	  them	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
occupational	  apparatus	  and	  therefore	  sought	  unsuccessfully	  to	  bar	  them	  from	  all	  oil	  sector	  
sites.	  By	  June	  of	  2003	  the	  interference	  of	  KBR	  and	  the	  humiliation	  felt	  be	  SOCU	  members	  in	  
working	  for	  a	  foreign	  occupational	  enterprise	  reached	  boiling	  point.	  Compounding	  this	  was	  
the	  fact	  that	  many	  SOCU	  members	  had	  not	  been	  paid	  since	  March.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  strike	  of	  
around	  100	  oil	  workers	  at	  the	  Basra	  oil	  refinery	  in	  Sheiba.	  They	  blockaded	  the	  road	  at	  the	  
front	  of	  the	  refinery	  and	  a	  five	  hour	  standoff	  ensued	  between	  them	  and	  British	  troops.	  The	  
move	  was	  immediately	  effective	  and	  SOCU	  successfully	  negotiated	  with	  the	  occupational	  
authorities	  for	  due	  wages	  to	  be	  awarded	  within	  a	  day.	  Despite	  this	  early	  success,	  wage	  
delays	  continued	  and	  in	  August	  SOCU	  took	  the	  drastic	  action	  of	  bringing	  a	  halt	  to	  oil	  exports	  
for	  two	  days.	  In	  response,	  the	  occupational	  authorities	  drafted	  ‘Order	  30’,	  a	  wage	  table	  
which	  was	  supposed	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  workers	  were	  paid	  fairly	  and	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.	  
However,	  not	  only	  did	  delays	  continue,	  the	  SOCU	  also	  claimed	  that	  the	  wage	  table	  did	  not	  
provide	  a	  fair	  income	  and	  did	  not	  allow	  for	  escalations	  in	  rent,	  food,	  and	  fuel.	  In	  response,	  
they	  drafted	  their	  own	  wage	  table	  and	  negotiated	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Oil,	  threatening	  a	  
general	  strike	  if	  their	  demands	  were	  not	  met	  ("Oil	  Workers’	  Union,"	  2005).	  By	  January	  of	  
2004,	  SOCU	  had	  claimed	  its	  first	  major	  victory	  –	  the	  US	  occupational	  authorities	  agreed	  to	  
pay	  the	  demanded	  wages	  ("Leave	  our	  country,"	  2005).	  	  
	  
The	  news	  of	  SOCU’s	  victory	  spread	  through	  Iraq’s	  oil	  industry	  and,	  when	  the	  Minister	  for	  Oil	  
visited	  the	  Basra	  Pipeline	  Company	  in	  February	  2004,	  they	  not	  only	  demanded	  to	  be	  





comrades	  in	  the	  SOCU.	  To	  make	  their	  point	  clear,	  the	  Basra	  oil	  workers	  went	  on	  strike,	  
shutting	  down	  oil	  export	  for	  at	  least	  four	  hours.	  The	  actions	  of	  the	  Basra	  Pipeline	  Company	  
were	  indicative	  of	  a	  broader	  trend	  in	  the	  Iraqi	  oil	  sector:	  the	  SOCU	  was	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  
the	  industry	  leader	  and	  capable	  of	  representing	  all	  their	  interests	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  
occupation.	  SOCU	  was	  therefore	  joined	  by	  around	  ten	  smaller	  unions	  across	  the	  oil	  and	  gas	  
sector	  and	  changed	  its	  name	  to	  the	  General	  Union	  of	  Oil	  Employees	  (GUOE)	  in	  June	  2004.	  
With	  some	  23,000	  members,	  the	  GUOE	  was	  an	  increasingly	  powerful	  union	  and	  few	  decision	  
regarding	  Iraq’s	  oil	  sector	  could	  be	  made	  in	  Baghdad	  without	  at	  least	  considering	  how	  it	  
would	  respond	  ("Oil	  Workers’	  Union,"	  2005).	  
	  
The	  GUOE	  began	  to	  really	  flex	  its	  political	  muscles	  in	  May	  2005	  when	  it	  hosted	  a	  large	  
international	  conference	  against	  the	  privatisation	  of	  Iraq’s	  oil	  industry.	  Aiming	  directly	  at	  the	  
complicity	  of	  certain	  Iraqi	  politicians	  in	  US	  plans	  to	  privatise	  Iraqi	  oil,	  the	  conference	  called	  
upon	  “members	  of	  Parliament…to	  take	  a	  firm	  stand	  against	  political	  currents	  and	  directives	  
calling	  for	  the	  privatisation	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  in	  Iraq”	  ("Iraqi	  oil	  workers,"	  2005).	  By	  June	  of	  
2005,	  around	  15,000	  workers	  at	  the	  GUOE	  conducted	  a	  peaceful	  24	  hour	  strike,	  cutting	  most	  
oil	  exports	  from	  the	  south	  of	  Iraq.	  This	  particular	  strike	  was	  conducted	  in	  support	  of	  
demands	  made	  by	  Basra	  Governor	  Mohammad	  Al-­‐Waili	  that	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  Basra’s	  
oil	  revenue	  be	  invested	  back	  into	  the	  regions	  infrastructure	  including	  addressing	  issues	  such	  
as	  sewerage,	  electricity,	  medical	  needs,	  poverty,	  malnutrition	  and	  unemployment.	  At	  the	  
time,	  around	  20%	  of	  Iraq’s	  oil	  revenue	  was	  being	  directly	  pumped	  into	  the	  coffers	  of	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Defence	  as	  Iraqi	  infrastructure	  crumbled.	  Al-­‐Waili	  is	  quoted	  as	  saying	  that	  “Faced	  
with	  a	  pathetic	  and	  unjust	  situation,	  our	  moral	  responsibility	  leads	  us	  to	  demand	  in	  the	  
name	  of	  our	  people	  a	  fair	  share	  of	  resources”	  (Al-­‐Waili	  as	  cited	  in:	  "Iraqi	  oil	  exports,"	  2005).	  	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  such	  mass	  action,	  in	  August	  2005	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  passed	  ‘Decree	  8750’	  
which	  was	  specifically	  designed	  to	  limit	  trade	  union	  activities	  by	  prohibiting	  them	  from	  
holding	  funds,	  collecting	  dues	  and	  maintaining	  assets,	  including	  any	  union	  established	  since	  
the	  fall	  of	  the	  former	  regime	  ("Worker	  Violations	  in	  Iraq,"	  2007).	  The	  only	  union	  exempt	  





hastily	  created	  in	  September	  2005	  from	  the	  merger	  of	  the	  Baathist-­‐era	  GFTU	  and	  a	  couple	  of	  
other	  pro-­‐government	  unions.	  However,	  the	  crackdown	  on	  all	  unions	  except	  those	  
sanctioned	  by	  the	  state	  is	  itself	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  Baathist	  regime	  –	  it	  severely	  limited	  
freedom	  of	  association	  and	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  citizen	  to	  peacefully	  organise,	  assemble	  
and	  strike	  ("Annual	  Survey	  Iraq,"	  2010).	  However,	  this	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  bother	  Al-­‐Asady	  who	  
continued	  his	  work	  among	  the	  oil	  workers	  of	  the	  south	  and	  arranged	  for	  the	  GUOE	  to	  
change	  its	  name	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  Federation	  of	  Oil	  Unions	  (IFOU)	  which,	  because	  of	  its	  continued	  
popularity	  in	  the	  industry,	  now	  had	  over	  26,000	  members.	  
	  
Following	  the	  December	  2005	  elections	  in	  Iraq,	  a	  six-­‐month	  political	  stalemate	  ensued	  with	  
little	  known	  Nuri	  Al-­‐Maliki	  of	  the	  Shia	  Islamist	  Da’wa	  party	  eventually	  nominated	  as	  Prime	  
Minister,	  his	  government	  finally	  taking	  office	  in	  May	  2006	  (Stansfield,	  2007:	  187-­‐9).	  Over	  the	  
next	  couple	  of	  years	  (2006-­‐7)	  Iraq	  descended	  into	  a	  particularly	  dark	  and	  unprecedented	  
period	  with	  grim	  and	  complex	  battles	  fought	  between	  the	  occupying	  forces,	  the	  Iraqi	  armed	  
services,	  various	  insurgent	  groups	  and	  terrorist	  organisations,	  as	  well	  as	  between	  competing	  
ethno-­‐religious	  sectarian	  militias	  (Dawisha,	  2009:	  258-­‐71).	  Deliberately	  targeted	  for	  their	  
ideology	  and	  actions,	  Iraq’s	  various	  unions	  came	  under	  attack:	  members	  were	  kidnapped,	  
detained,	  tortured	  and	  killed	  by	  a	  host	  of	  different	  factions,	  their	  offices	  were	  repeatedly	  
bombed	  or	  looted	  and	  their	  activities	  were	  severely	  limited	  (for	  a	  grim	  list,	  see	  "Violence	  
Against	  Unionists,"	  2007;	  "Worker	  Violations	  in	  Iraq,"	  2007).	  Nonetheless	  on	  the	  22	  August	  
2006	  some	  700	  IFOU	  members	  went	  on	  strike	  to	  demand	  the	  payment	  of	  delayed	  wages	  
and	  to	  call	  for	  over-­‐time	  payments,	  pay	  increases	  and	  better	  working	  conditions.	  The	  strike	  
cut	  off	  some	  oil	  transport	  from	  the	  south	  to	  Baghdad	  having	  the	  immediate	  effect	  of	  
generating	  promises	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Oil	  to	  address	  all	  outstanding	  issues.	  However,	  
when	  authorities	  continued	  to	  fail	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  promises	  by	  4	  September,	  the	  IFOU	  
resumed	  their	  strike	  ("Worker	  Violations	  in	  Iraq,"	  2007).	  	  
	  
Without	  any	  consultation	  with	  IFOU	  or	  Iraq’s	  oil	  sector,	  in	  late	  2006	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  
endorsed	  the	  Iraqi	  Oil	  Law	  (also	  known	  as	  the	  Iraqi	  Hydrocarbon	  Law).	  This	  law	  had	  originally	  





Administration	  in	  2004.	  The	  IFOU	  leadership	  vehemently	  opposed	  the	  law	  because	  it	  would	  
see	  up	  to	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  Iraq’s	  natural	  resources	  signed	  over	  to	  international	  companies	  on	  
20	  year	  contracts	  ("IFOU,"	  2010b;	  "Iraqi	  Unions	  Condemn,"	  2006).	  The	  issue	  here	  was	  a	  
particular	  clause	  of	  the	  draft	  law	  which	  would	  allow	  for	  production-­‐sharing	  agreements	  with	  
foreign	  oil	  companies.	  IFOU	  saw	  such	  a	  law	  as	  a	  throwback	  to	  colonial	  exploitation	  of	  Iraqi	  
oil	  and	  as	  a	  blatant	  attempt	  by	  the	  US	  to	  commandeer	  Iraq’s	  oil	  wealth	  for	  their	  own	  profit	  
("Iraqi	  workers	  strike,"	  2011).	  However,	  when	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  continued	  to	  ignore	  the	  
objections	  of	  IFOU	  to	  the	  draft	  law,	  the	  union	  sent	  a	  public	  letter	  to	  the	  Iraqi	  Oil	  Ministry	  on	  
27	  April	  and	  then	  again	  on	  5	  May	  2007	  in	  which	  they	  outlined	  a	  list	  of	  17	  demands.	  These	  
included	  improvements	  to	  wages,	  health	  benefits	  and	  other	  working	  conditions,	  as	  well	  as	  
consultation	  on	  the	  proposed	  Iraqi	  Oil	  Law	  ("IFOU	  Strike	  Demands,"	  2007).	  They	  also	  called	  
for	  the	  sacking	  of	  the	  general	  manager	  of	  the	  SOC	  and	  for	  the	  financial	  and	  administrative	  
independence	  of	  the	  company	  from	  the	  Baghdad-­‐based	  central	  ministry	  ("IRAQ:	  Oil	  
workers,"	  2007).	  	  
	  
IFOU	  gave	  the	  ministry	  until	  the	  10	  May	  to	  respond	  before	  they	  would	  go	  on	  strike	  –	  
effectively	  stopping	  production	  in	  major	  southern	  oil-­‐rich	  provinces.	  At	  the	  time,	  this	  would	  
have	  brought	  to	  a	  standstill	  an	  estimated	  93%	  of	  the	  federal	  government’s	  budget.	  Not	  
surprisingly,	  Maliki	  panicked	  and	  the	  strikes	  were	  delayed	  when	  he	  and	  delegates	  from	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Oil	  organised	  a	  meeting	  with	  members	  of	  the	  IFOU,	  including	  Al-­‐Asady.	  This	  
resulted	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  committee	  tasked	  with	  working	  on	  finding	  solutions	  
acceptable	  to	  both	  sides.	  However,	  when	  the	  government	  failed	  to	  deliver	  on	  any	  of	  its	  
promises	  by	  June,	  some	  600	  IFOU	  members	  went	  on	  strike	  across	  southern	  Iraq,	  bringing	  an	  
immediate	  halt	  to	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  oil	  products,	  kerosene	  and	  gas	  to	  much	  of	  the	  country	  
(Cogan,	  2007;	  "Iraq	  government	  orders,"	  2007).	  A	  few	  days	  later,	  Maliki	  responded	  by	  
stating	  that	  he	  would	  “strike	  with	  an	  iron	  fist	  anyone	  that	  would	  tamper	  with	  the	  public	  
order	  or	  carry	  out	  evil	  schemes	  undermining	  the	  state’s	  higher	  interests”,	  labelling	  the	  IFOU	  
leaders	  “outlaws	  and	  saboteurs”	  (Maliki	  cited	  in	  Cogan,	  2007).	  The	  Iraqi	  military	  surrounded	  
the	  oil	  workers	  and	  arrest	  warrants	  were	  issued	  for	  several	  IFOU	  leaders	  including	  Al-­‐Asady	  





IFOU’s	  support	  committee	  in	  the	  UK	  pointed	  out	  that	  “Issuing	  a	  warrant	  for	  the	  arrest	  of	  the	  
oil	  workers’	  leaders	  is	  an	  outrageous	  attack	  on	  trade	  union	  and	  democratic	  freedom”	  
(Ramadani	  as	  cited	  in:	  "Iraq	  government	  orders,"	  2007).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  union	  held	  firm	  
and,	  after	  several	  days	  of	  meetings	  and	  much	  political	  deliberation,	  Al-­‐Asady	  released	  a	  
statement	  which	  claimed:	  	  
	  
Finally	  the	  workers	  have	  won	  in	  demanding	  their	  legitimate	  rights…	  And	  after	  
deliberations…the	  two	  sides	  agreed	  to	  halt	  the	  strike	  and	  to	  use	  dialogue	  in	  dealings	  
to	  resolve	  the	  outstanding	  issues…	  Therefore	  we	  would	  like	  to	  say	  to	  all	  that	  the	  
workers	  will	  is	  indestructible.	  The	  workers	  can	  achieve	  what	  they	  want	  by	  the	  means	  
available	  to	  them	  and	  their	  strength.	  And	  the	  oil	  workers	  are	  very	  strong,	  because	  
they	  have	  a	  legitimate	  right…	  Long	  live	  the	  Iraqi	  working	  class.	  (Al-­‐Asady,	  2007)	  
	  
However,	   the	   fight	  was	   far	   from	  over.	   In	   the	   following	  month	   (July	  2007)	   IFOU	  conducted	  
further	  rallies	  in	  Basra	  in	  protest	  of	  the	  draft	  Iraqi	  Oil	  Law.	  Even	  the	  state	  sanctioned	  GFIW	  
indicated	  their	  strong	  opposition	  to	  the	   law.	  They	  demanded	  that	  the	  government	  consult	  
with	   and	   include	   members	   of	   the	   union	   in	   the	   discussions	   and	   explained	   that	   they	  
adamantly	  reject	  the	  privatization	  of	  Iraq’s	  national	  oil	  wealth	  ("Statement	  Issued	  by	  GFIW,"	  
2007).	  Indicating	  his	  disdain	  for	  any	  critical	  union	  movement,	  the	  Iraqi	  Oil	  Minister,	  Hussain	  
Al-­‐Shahristani,	   issued	  a	   statement	   in	  which	  he	  ordered	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Oil	   to	   immediately	  
halt	  any	  “cooperation	  with	  any	  member	  of	  any	  union	   in	  any	  of	   the	  committees	  organized	  
under	  the	  name	  of	  the	  union	  as	  these	  unions	  do	  not	  enjoy	  any	  legal	  status	  to	  work	  inside	  the	  
government	  sector”	  (Shahristani	  cited	  in	  "U.S.	  Unions	  Rally,"	  2007).	  
	  
By	  May	  2008,	  while	  the	  Iraqi	  Oil	  Law	  had	  not	  been	  officially	  ratified,	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  
had	  begun	  courting	  several	  large	  international	  oil	  companies	  such	  as	  Chevron	  and	  
ExxonMobil	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  securing	  lucrative	  contracts.	  In	  perhaps	  his	  most	  provocative	  
move	  to	  date,	  Al-­‐Asady	  responded	  by	  issuing	  a	  statement	  to	  the	  annual	  shareholder	  





We	  call	  upon	  the	  governments,	  corporations	  and	  other	  institutions	  behind	  the	  
ongoing	  occupation	  of	  Iraq	  to	  respond	  to	  our	  demands	  for	  real	  democracy,	  true	  
sovereignty	  and	  self-­‐determination,	  free	  of	  all	  foreign	  interference.	  Five	  years	  of	  
invasion,	  war	  and	  occupation	  have	  brought	  nothing	  but	  death,	  destruction,	  misery	  
and	  suffering	  to	  our	  people…	  Our	  union	  offices	  have	  been	  raided.	  Union	  property	  has	  
been	  seized	  and	  destroyed.	  Our	  bank	  accounts	  have	  been	  frozen.	  Our	  leaders	  have	  
been	  beaten,	  arrested,	  abducted	  and	  assassinated.	  Our	  rights	  as	  workers	  are	  
routinely	  violated.	  This	  is	  an	  attack	  on	  our	  rights	  and	  the	  basic	  precepts	  of	  a	  
democratic	  society…	  We	  call	  upon	  you…to	  end	  the	  nightmare	  of	  occupation	  and	  
restore	  our	  sovereignty	  and	  national	  independence	  so	  that	  we	  can	  chart	  our	  own	  
course	  to	  the	  future.	  (Al-­‐Asady,	  2008)	  
	  
The	  statement	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  list	  4	  key	  demands	  including:	  the	  immediate	  withdrawal	  of	  all	  
foreign	  troops;	  the	  passage	  of	  a	  labour	  law	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  workers;	  an	  end	  to	  
meddling	  in	  Iraq’s	  economic	  affairs	  by	  foreign	  powers	  and	  multinational	  corporations;	  and	  
that	  the	  “US	  government,	  oil	  companies	  and	  others	  immediately	  cease	  lobbying	  for	  the	  oil	  
law	  which	  would	  fracture	  the	  country	  and	  hand	  control	  over	  our	  oil	  to	  multinational	  
companies	  like	  ExxonMobil	  and	  Chevron”	  (Al-­‐Asady,	  2008).	  Despite	  such	  vehement	  
opposition	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  appropriate	  legal	  framework,	  British	  and	  American	  oil	  
companies	  such	  as	  Shell,	  British	  Petroleum	  (BP),	  and	  Total,	  as	  well	  as	  both	  Chevron	  and	  
ExxonMobil	  were	  awarded	  a	  series	  of	  lucrative	  oil	  contracts	  on	  30	  June	  2008,	  fuelling	  the	  
notion	  that	  the	  war	  was	  all	  about	  Western	  profiteering	  from	  Iraqi	  oil.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  next	  round	  of	  oil	  contracts	  awarded	  by	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  a	  year	  later	  (June	  2009),	  
BP	  and	  China	  National	  Petroleum	  Company	  bid	  for	  sites	  such	  as	  the	  Rumailah	  oil	  field	  in	  
Basra,	  the	  country’s	  largest	  producing	  oilfield	  ("IFOU	  Threatens	  Escalation,"	  2009).	  IFOU	  
threatened	  to	  escalate	  their	  opposition	  and	  a	  senior	  member	  of	  the	  union,	  Falih	  Abboud	  
Imara,	  commented	  at	  the	  time:	  “If	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Oil	  insists	  on	  executing	  the	  agreements	  
with	  the	  foreign	  companies,	  we	  will	  work	  on	  making	  the	  deals	  fail”	  (Imara	  cited	  in	  "Acute	  





complete	  strikes	  across	  all	  of	  Iraq’s	  southern	  oil	  refineries	  controlled	  by	  the	  IFOU,	  totally	  
halting	  production.	  Given	  this	  environment,	  it	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  the	  Iraqi	  Ministry	  of	  
Oil	  stepped	  up	  its	  crackdown	  on	  the	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  of	  Iraq’s	  oil	  unions.	  Shahristani	  
employed	  several	  key	  tactics:	  he	  continued	  to	  maintain	  the	  union	  activity	  was	  in	  fact	  illegal	  
because	  the	  1987	  Baathist	  law	  prohibiting	  unions	  had	  not	  been	  overturned;	  he	  threatened	  
to	  sue	  the	  IFOU	  leadership	  for	  provocations	  against	  the	  government	  and	  foreign	  companies	  
if	  they	  continued	  to	  create	  obstacles	  to	  reaching	  agreements	  with	  international	  oil	  firms;	  
and	  he	  ordered	  the	  forced	  relocation	  of	  many	  IFOU	  members	  and	  activists	  throughout	  2008-­‐
10,	  including	  union	  leaders	  like	  Vice	  President	  Ibrahim	  Radhi	  (Norton-­‐Taylor,	  2008;	  
"Solidarity	  Center	  Decries,"	  2010).	  The	  latter	  was	  particularly	  onerous	  not	  only	  because	  it	  is	  
a	  major	  breach	  of	  civil	  rights	  and	  a	  blatant	  attempt	  at	  union-­‐busting,	  but	  also	  because	  it	  was	  
very	  dangerous	  with	  union	  members	  usually	  transferred	  to	  unsafe	  areas	  or	  those	  with	  
different	  ethno-­‐religious	  or	  tribal	  affiliations	  ("Annual	  Survey	  Iraq,"	  2010).	  
	  
At	  the	  March	  2010	  elections	  no	  one	  Iraqi	  political	  block	  managed	  to	  secure	  the	  163	  seats	  
needed	  to	  form	  a	  government	  in	  the	  325	  member	  Parliament.	  This	  saw	  the	  nation	  plummet	  
into	  nine	  long	  months	  of	  political	  stalemate	  with	  much	  of	  Iraq’s	  political	  elite	  failing	  to	  
encourage	  the	  mutually	  beneficial	  dialogue	  and	  debate	  critical	  to	  democracy.	  Foremost	  
among	  these	  was	  Maliki	  himself	  who	  was	  determined	  to	  cling	  to	  power	  and	  underwent	  an	  
aggressive	  and	  multifaceted	  campaign	  towards	  such	  an	  end	  (Ottaway	  &	  Kaysi,	  2010b).	  In	  the	  
middle	  of	  2010,	  as	  the	  government	  deadlock	  continued	  and	  Iraqis	  sweltered	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  
summer	  with	  only	  sporadic	  electricity	  to	  fuel	  their	  air	  conditioners	  and	  poor	  access	  to	  
drinking	  water,	  frustrations	  literally	  reached	  boiling	  point	  (Isakhan,	  2012b).	  Several	  protests	  
and	  sit-­‐ins	  erupted	  across	  Iraq,	  the	  largest	  and	  longest	  of	  which	  were	  held	  in	  the	  south	  at	  
Nasiriyah	  and	  Basra.	  In	  reaction	  to	  the	  protests,	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  underwent	  a	  two-­‐
pronged	  attack	  to	  quell	  civil	  unrest.	  The	  first	  prong	  was	  a	  severe	  set	  of	  regulations	  which	  
limited	  the	  ability	  of	  Iraqis	  to	  organize	  peaceful	  protests.	  The	  new	  regulations	  also	  permitted	  
the	  Iraqi	  Security	  Forces	  (ISF)	  to	  use	  “all	  known	  methods	  to	  disperse	  protestors”,	  including	  
unlimited	  force,	  which	  led	  to	  intimidation	  and	  arrest	  of	  protest	  organizers	  as	  well	  as	  injuries	  





before	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  brought	  charges	  against	  IFOU	  and	  issued	  arrest	  warrants	  for	  
Awad	  and	  other	  senior	  members	  such	  as	  General	  Secretary,	  Faleh	  Abood	  Umara,	  because	  
they	  urged	  strikes	  and	  had	  spoken	  to	  both	  the	  Iraqi	  and	  international	  media	  about	  the	  poor	  
conditions	  suffered	  by	  Iraq’s	  oil	  workers	  ("IFOU,"	  2010a;	  "Union	  leaders	  taken,"	  2010).	  
	  
The	  second	  prong	  was	  to	  replace	  the	  troubled	  and	  unpopular	  Minister	  for	  Electricity,	  Karim	  
Waheed.	  Upon	  first	  glance	  this	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  gesture	  by	  Maliki	  to	  appease	  the	  
protestor’s	  calls	  for	  Waheed’s	  resignation.	  However,	  Maliki	  replaced	  Waheed	  with	  
Shahristani	  who	  now	  headed	  both	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Oil	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Electricity.	  It	  was	  
not	  long	  before	  Shahristani	  employed	  his	  well-­‐crafted	  and	  draconian	  approach	  to	  trade	  
unions	  to	  the	  electricity	  sector.	  He	  ordered	  police	  raids	  on	  the	  headquarters	  of	  the	  Basra-­‐
based	  Iraqi	  Electrical	  Utility	  Workers	  Union	  (IEUWU)	  and	  he	  then	  outlawed	  the	  electricity	  
unions	  and	  had	  many	  of	  them	  forcibly	  shutdown,	  citing	  the	  Saddam-­‐era	  anti-­‐union	  laws	  
("Annual	  Survey	  Iraq,"	  2010;	  "Iraqi	  Minister	  Closes,"	  2010).	  At	  the	  time,	  Shahristani	  was	  
quoted	  as	  saying	  
It	  is	  not	  a	  new	  thing	  and	  when	  I	  went	  to	  [the]	  electricity	  ministry	  I	  activated	  this	  law	  
as	  I	  am	  very	  keen	  to	  implement	  the	  law…	  Any	  employee	  who	  gets	  a	  salary	  to	  do	  a	  
specific	  work,	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  do	  any	  other	  activities	  under	  any	  name,	  whether	  it	  is	  
a	  union	  or	  humanitarian	  or	  a	  national	  activities	  or	  whatever	  activity.	  (Shahristani	  
cited	  in	  Lando,	  2010)	  
	  
Iraq’s	  2010	  political	  deadlock	  continued	  until	  early	  November	  when	  an	  agreement	  was	  
signed	  which	  would	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  government.	  Finally,	  a	  government	  
was	  announced	  in	  December	  of	  2010	  and	  –	  to	  the	  grave	  disappointment	  of	  many	  Iraqis	  –	  
much	  remained	  the	  same:	  Maliki	  would	  retain	  the	  position	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  many	  
other	  key	  positions	  would	  rotate	  between	  a	  handful	  of	  familiar	  faces	  (Ottaway	  &	  Kaysi,	  
2010a).	  One	  substantial	  change	  was	  the	  appointment	  of	  Shahristani	  as	  Deputy	  Prime	  
Minister	  for	  Energy.	  It	  seems	  Shahristani’s	  heavy	  handed	  approach	  to	  cracking	  down	  on	  
unions,	  protests	  and	  civil	  society	  had	  impressed	  Maliki	  and	  he	  was	  duly	  rewarded.	  At	  the	  





signed	  with	  major	  international	  energy	  companies,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Iraq	  had	  not	  
officially	  ratified	  its	  Oil	  Law	  and	  the	  move	  had	  been	  strongly	  resisted	  by	  the	  sector,	  
especially	  IFOU	  ("Iraq	  to	  lead,"	  2010).	  
	  
As	  Shahristani	  took	  up	  his	  new	  post	  in	  Baghdad,	  the	  very	  first	  protests	  were	  beginning	  to	  
occur	  across	  Tunisia.	  As	  long	  lasting	  and	  deeply	  entrenched	  regimes	  fell	  across	  the	  region	  
and	  as	  citizens	  embraced	  a	  new	  era	  of	  dissent	  and	  democratization,	  Iraqis	  were	  confronted	  
with	  the	  failures	  of	  their	  own	  democracy	  to	  deliver	  on	  the	  many	  promises	  made	  to	  them	  
since	  2003	  (Isakhan,	  Mansouri,	  &	  Akbarzadeh,	  2012).	  This	  led	  to	  weeks	  of	  scattered	  protests	  
across	  Iraq,	  culminating	  in	  the	  ‘Day	  of	  Rage’	  (25	  February	  2011)	  in	  which	  thousands	  of	  
protestors	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  in	  at	  least	  17	  separate	  demonstrations	  across	  the	  country	  
following	  Friday	  prayers.	  In	  Baghdad’s	  own	  Tahir	  square	  thousands	  of	  Iraqi	  protestors	  
gathered	  to	  voice	  their	  concerns	  and	  air	  their	  frustrations,	  with	  many	  calling	  for	  an	  end	  to	  
Maliki’s	  leadership	  ("Deadly	  protests,"	  2011;	  "Fresh	  protests,"	  2011).	  
	  
Predictably,	  Maliki	  reacted	  to	  such	  events	  in	  ways	  similar	  to	  dictators	  and	  autocrats	  across	  
the	  region:	  he	  ordered	  a	  brutal	  crackdown	  on	  the	  Iraqi	  protestors,	  journalists	  and	  civil	  
society	  or	  political	  actors	  who	  had	  been	  involved	  in	  the	  events.	  The	  ISF	  and	  the	  protestors	  
clashed	  frequently,	  leading	  to	  many	  arrests,	  beatings	  and	  deaths.	  This	  also	  included	  a	  
crackdown	  on	  the	  nation’s	  oil	  sector.	  In	  February,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Oil	  issued	  official	  penalties	  
of	  around	  USD$50,000	  each	  to	  several	  refinery	  employees	  for	  having	  delayed	  production	  for	  
less	  than	  24	  hours	  in	  order	  to	  protest	  conditions	  and	  pay	  ("Minister	  of	  Oil,"	  2011).	  Such	  
figures	  are	  exorbitant	  by	  international	  standards	  and	  impossible	  to	  pay	  for	  average	  Iraqis	  –	  
the	  daily	  wage	  for	  skilled	  labor	  is	  around	  $10	  per	  day,	  unskilled	  labor	  as	  low	  as	  $4.50.	  Similar	  
fines	  were	  also	  issued	  to	  organizers	  of	  a	  combined	  IFOU	  and	  GFIW	  protest	  of	  more	  than	  300	  
oil	  sector	  employees	  outside	  the	  headquarters	  of	  the	  SOC	  in	  May.	  They	  rallied	  against	  the	  
deep-­‐seated	  corruption	  among	  management	  and	  demanded	  their	  pay-­‐rate	  match	  that	  of	  
employees	  of	  foreign	  oil	  companies.	  One	  oil	  worker,	  Assad	  Abu	  Hussein	  said	  	  
If	  the	  Southern	  Oil	  Company	  does	  not	  give	  us	  our	  rights	  of	  profits	  and	  bonuses,	  we	  





foreign	  company	  like	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  oil	  fields,	  we	  are	  being	  treated	  unfairly.	  
(Bedford,	  2011)	  
	  
In	  response,	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  issued	  ‘Decree	  95’	  and	  ‘Decree	  97’,	  which	  officially	  
withdrew	  their	  recognition	  of	  the	  once	  state-­‐backed	  GFIW,	  immediately	  appointing	  their	  
replacement	  in	  the	  new	  “Ministerial	  Preparatory	  Committee”	  (MPC).	  In	  one	  swift	  maneuver	  
the	  Iraqi	  government	  had	  rid	  themselves	  of	  any	  official	  and	  troublesome	  union	  movement	  in	  
favor	  of	  an	  un-­‐elected	  and	  politically	  partisan	  MPC	  who	  took	  over	  the	  supervision	  of	  Iraq’s	  
official	  trade	  sector,	  including	  the	  forthcoming	  union	  elections	  ("Iraqi	  Government	  Moves,"	  
2011).	  It	  almost	  goes	  without	  saying	  that	  such	  moves	  are	  not	  only	  profoundly	  anti-­‐
democratic,	  they	  also	  speak	  to	  a	  complex	  Iraqi	  political	  landscape	  in	  which	  the	  ruling	  elite	  
are	  becoming	  increasingly	  authoritarian	  and	  oppressive.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
This	  is	  a	  critical	  time	  for	  Iraqi	  trade	  unions	  and	  workers	  movements	  such	  as	  the	  IFOU.	  They	  
continue	  to	  endure	  poor	  conditions,	  low	  pay,	  little	  safety,	  and	  virtually	  no	  rights.	  In	  the	  
decade	  that	  has	  elapsed	  since	  the	  invasion,	  neither	  the	  US	  occupation	  nor	  the	  Iraqi	  
government	  have	  made	  any	  substantive	  effort	  to	  overturn	  the	  oppressive	  Baathist	  laws	  
which	  restrict	  the	  rights	  of	  unions	  to	  advocate	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  workers.	  Similarly,	  the	  lack	  of	  
an	  appropriate	  legal	  framework	  governing	  foreign	  oil	  investment	  has	  left	  billions	  of	  dollars	  
of	  Iraq’s	  oil	  wealth	  exposed	  to	  foreign	  exploitation	  and	  rampant	  corruption.	  In	  addition,	  
unions	  like	  IFOU	  have	  been	  actively	  suppressed	  by	  military	  force	  and	  the	  strong-­‐arm	  tactics	  
of	  an	  increasingly	  oppressive	  state	  which	  has	  mastered	  the	  manipulation	  of	  democracy	  for	  
authoritarian	  ends.	  Despite	  all	  of	  this,	  there	  are	  several	  very	  interesting	  points	  to	  be	  made	  
about	  the	  rise	  of	  trade	  unions	  and	  workers	  movements	  since	  2003.	  Firstly,	  these	  indigenous,	  
localized	  and	  highly	  co-­‐ordinated	  movements	  reveal	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  people’s	  will	  
towards	  democracy	  and	  that	  they	  are	  more	  than	  capable	  of	  utilising	  democratic	  mechanisms	  
in	  the	  face	  of	  foreign	  interference	  or	  authoritarian	  forms	  of	  power.	  Secondly,	  while	  the	  
participation	  and	  engagement	  of	  the	  Iraqi	  citizenship	  with	  democratic	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  





Specifically,	  a	  strong	  union	  movement	  is	  not	  only	  crucial	  in	  re-­‐establishing	  an	  engaged	  public	  
life,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  help	  to	  abate	  the	  many	  conflicts	  across	  Iraq	  and	  thereby	  aid	  the	  shift	  
towards	  a	  free,	  egalitarian	  and	  democratic	  nation.	  Finally,	  IFOU	  and	  other	  unions	  are	  critical	  
in	  holding	  the	  Iraqi	  government	  to	  account;	  they	  are	  an	  informal	  network	  of	  power	  that	  has	  
proven	  themselves	  capable	  of	  advocating	  for	  democratic	  change	  in	  the	  face	  of	  various	  forms	  
of	  tyranny	  and	  oppression.	  Whichever	  way	  Iraq	  turns	  from	  here,	  Iraqi	  trade	  unions	  and	  
workers	  movements	  such	  as	  IFOU	  will	  be	  critical	  to	  the	  nation’s	  stability	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  
develop	  a	  robust	  and	  stable	  democracy.	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